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“JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT”: EASIER SAID THAN DONE
RESOLVING DISPARITIES AMONG COURTS REGARDING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SENTENCING JUVENILES TO
DE FACTO LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE
Audrey Fernandez*
ABSTRACT
This comment addresses the Eighth Amendment violation inherent in
sentencing juvenile offenders to a lengthy term of years constituting a de
facto life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence. The Supreme Court has held that
the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders
to the death penalty, LWOP for non-homicide offenses, and mandatory
LWOP for homicide offenses. Recently, the Court granted certiorari in the
case of Mathena v. Malvo to determine whether the Court’s precedent can be
used to upend discretionary life-without-parole sentences. However, circuit
courts remain divided on the issue of whether a de facto LWOP sentence
violates the Eighth Amendment. This comment argues that the reason for the
divide lies in the sentencing courts’ inability to fully appreciate and
implement the Court’s juvenile sentencing precedent and the reasoning
behind those holdings. In an effort to resolve the discord among lower courts
on the issue of de facto LWOP, this note proposes recommendations aimed
at bridging the gap between Supreme Court case law and federal sentencing
factors and guidelines.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The American criminal justice system recognizes a fundamental
difference between adult and juvenile offenders for sentencing purposes.1 As
compared to adults, juveniles—including those who have committed terrible
crimes—lack maturity, are vulnerable to negative influences, and have a
greater capacity for rehabilitation.2 These differences present Eighth
Amendment proportionality concerns in instances where juveniles face the
possibility of receiving the harshest possible sentences, typically imposed on
offenders who are all morally culpable and irreparably corrupt.3 The Supreme
Court has held that the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment categorically prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to
the death penalty,4 life without parole (LWOP) for non-homicide offenses,5

* J.D. 2020, Florida International University College of Law. I would like to thank my parents,
Odalys and Juan Carlos, for always reminding me that gold has a price, but an education is priceless. I
would also like to thank Professor Rima Mullins for her guidance throughout the writing process and for
our shared enthusiasm on this topic. Finally, a special thanks to the editors of the FIU Law Review for
publishing my note.
1 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 474 (2012).
2 Id. at 471.
3 The Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions “flows from the basic
‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned’” to the offender and
the offense. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
367 (1910)).
4 See id. at 568.
5 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
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and mandatory LWOP for homicide offenses.6 However, the Court’s
precedent does not outright preclude a juvenile offender from receiving
lengthy term-of-years sentences for both homicide and non-homicide
offenses.7 These lengthy term-of-years sentences can be likened to a death
penalty or LWOP sentence because they place the juvenile’s first opportunity
at release well beyond the age of retirement8 or, in more extreme instances,
beyond the average life expectancy of the juvenile.9 In light of this similarity,
these sentences effectively constitute de facto LWOP sentences.
Responses in the lower courts to this issue of de facto LWOP sentences
vary depending on a particular court’s construction of what the Court’s
juvenile sentencing cases stand for and what they apply to. For instance, some
state courts have held that Miller applies equally to LWOP and de facto
LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders.10 These courts move beyond a strict
interpretation of Miller and its predecessors, focusing instead on the spirit
behind the “juveniles are different” mantra repeatedly espoused by the
Court.11 However, other courts opt to interpret Miller strictly, and thereby see
no problem imposing lengthy term-of-years sentences because such
sentences do not have the LWOP label explicitly denied in Miller.12
This note argues that de facto LWOP sentences13 pose constitutional
concerns for juvenile offenders similar to those posed by a death penalty
sentence or a LWOP sentence.14 For one, imposing de facto LWOP sentences
seems to be at odds with the Supreme Court’s transition towards
individualized sentencing consideration of the mitigating circumstances

6

Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 151–52 (3d Cir. 2018).
8 “Full retirement age (also called ‘normal retirement age’) had been 65 for many years.
However, beginning with people born in 1938 or later, that age gradually increases until it reaches 67
for
people
born
after
1959.”
Retirement
Age
Calculator,
SOC. SECURITY,
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/ageincrease.html.
9 In 2017, life expectancy at birth was 78.6 for the entire U.S. population. This represents a
decrease from 78.7 years in 2016. Sherry L. Murphy, Dr. Jiaquan Xu, Kenneth D. Kochanek & Dr.
Elizabeth Arias, Mortality in the United States, 2017, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 328 (Nov. 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db328-h.pdf.
10 See infra Part I (C).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 While no strict legal definition for a de facto life sentence exists, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission defines the cutoff for de facto life at 470 months, just a few months shy of 40 years. GLENN
R. SCHMITT & HYUN J. KONFRST, LIFE SENTENCES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2015),
https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-publications/life-sentences-federal-criminal-justice-system.
14 Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses to De Facto Life
Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3439,
3442 (2014).
7
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surrounding youth.15 The Supreme Court seems to suggest that consideration
of a juvenile’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change will
rarely result in imposing harsh penalties such as LWOP.16 This, however, has
not proven true with harsh penalties such as de facto LWOP sentences.
Courts imposing de facto LWOP sentences seem to avoid the “basic thrust”
of Roper, Graham, and Miller by refusing to recognize that the underlying
rationale of the Supreme Court centers around individualized sentencing for
juveniles, not the particular crime that juveniles commit.17
Additionally, de facto LWOP sentences do not provide a juvenile
offender “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,”18 in direct contradiction to the
purpose behind the juvenile criminal system.19 Imprisoning juvenile
offenders up until or past their life expectancy alters the remainder of his life
“by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”20 With a de facto LWOP sentence, a
juvenile surrenders any “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”21
This note seeks to provide an explanation for why juveniles still receive
de facto LWOP sentences in light of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Roper,
Graham, and Miller directing sentencing authorities to take an individualized
approach to juvenile sentencing and prohibiting the imposition of the harshest
penalties on juveniles. The reason, this note argues, lies in the reality that
sentencing procedures and policies fail to consider the Supreme Court’s
observations regarding the rehabilitative nature of juveniles. First, all states
have one or more transfer statutes providing for the transfer of juvenile
offenders from state court to federal court.22 Once in federal court, the
applicable sentencing guidelines and factors taken into account by the

15 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“Graham, Roper, and our individualized
sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”).
16 Id. at 479 (“But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”).
17 See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72–73 (Iowa 2013).
18 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
19 Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 804–05 (2003)
(“Two related claims were at the heart of the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice: that young offenders
were misguided children rather than culpable wrongdoers, and that the sole purpose of state intervention
was to promote their welfare through rehabilitation.”); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of
Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 146 (2003) (“[T]he state could best address the resulting
inappropriate conduct of these children through remedial rather than punitive measures.”).
20 Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)).
21 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
22 Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGIS. (Jan. 11, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-ofjurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx.
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sentencing authority fail to provide sufficient means for considering the
juvenile’s age and other mitigating circumstances surrounding juvenile
status.23 In an effort to resolve the discord among lower courts on the issue
of de facto LWOP, this note proposes recommendations to bridge the gap
between Supreme Court case law and sentencing factors.
This note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses how the Supreme
Court has analyzed the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment as applicable to juvenile sentencing. This section also
details how the lower courts have responded to de facto LWOP for homicide
and non-homicide juvenile offenders in light of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Miller. Part II discusses sentencing procedures and statutes applicable to
juveniles and how these policies facilitate the imposition of de facto LWOP
sentences on juvenile offenders. Finally, Part III recommends statutory
amendments and implementations aimed at eliminating the imposition of de
facto LWOP sentences for juveniles.
II.

THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE SENTENCING UNDER THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT

This part will provide an overview of the factors considered by the
courts when conducting an Eighth Amendment analysis of juvenile
sentencing, as well as the history and development of juvenile sentencing
jurisprudence in the context of the Eighth Amendment. Finally, this part will
introduce the problem faced by lower courts in trying to reconcile the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller and Graham with the imposition of de
facto LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders.
A. Constitutional Analysis of Punishment under the Eighth
Amendment
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”24 Central to understanding the scope of cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment are the concepts of
proportionality and decency.
A punishment violates the Eighth Amendment when it is “grossly
disproportionate” to the crime committed.25 Punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to both the nature of the offense and the
23

See infra Part III (B).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
25 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24
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characteristics of the offender.26 Generally, the Supreme Court’s cases
addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within one of two
classifications. The first classification involves challenges to the duration of
a term-of-years sentence in light of all relevant circumstances in a particular
case.27 This classification requires courts to compare the gravity of the
offense and the severity of the sentence to determine if the sentence imposed
is unconstitutionally excessive.28 The second classification involves placing
categorical restrictions on the death penalty.29 This classification uses
categorical rules to define Eighth Amendment standards, and considers both
the nature of the offense and the characteristics of the offender.30
Another factor considered in evaluating the constitutionality of
punishment under the Eighth Amendment is the “evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”31 The Supreme Court
has adopted the position that it is free to interpret the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause in accordance with current moral standards and is thereby
not bound by the clause’s original meaning.32 These standards are measured
by “objective factors to the maximum possible extent.”33 The factors
primarily consist of legislative enactments and state practice,34 sentencing
jury determinations,35 and the views of relevant expert entities.36 In addition
to these factors, the Court employs its own independent judgement, as
informed by its understanding of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history,
meaning, and purpose.37

26

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).
28 Id. at 60 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
29 Id. at 59.
30 Id. at 60.
31 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
32 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
33 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
34 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (describing state laws as “the clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.” Applying this standard, the Court in Atkins
counted eighteen states that had abolished the death penalty for “mentally retarded” persons during the
decade and a half following a controversial execution in Georgia in 1986. The Court also derived a
consensus of contemporary value in the infrequency with which states permitting such executions actually
carried them out.).
35 Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (citing amici briefs from both the
American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association, which stated that juveniles
are more capable of change than are adults, and that their actions are less likely to be evidence of
“irretrievably depraved character” than are the actions of adults).
37 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
27
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B. Juvenile Sentencing Jurisprudence
Children have been classified differently under the law since the early
1800s.38
In recent years, the Supreme Court has developed a line of cases that has
transformed the Eighth Amendment analysis of severe juvenile sentencing
practices.39 At the core of each of the Court’s decisions is the understanding
that “juveniles are different,” and this difference impacts the constitutionality
of juvenile punishment.40
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma: “Juveniles are Different”
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of permissible sentences
for juvenile offenders in Thompson v. Oklahoma.41 In this case, a fifteenyear-old boy was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.42
The Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibited
imposing the death penalty for juvenile offenders who were under the age of
sixteen at the time they committed the offense.43 The Court reasoned that
offenders under sixteen years of age have limited criminal culpability, as
compared to their adult counterparts.44 The court noted that, as compared to
adults, adolescents are more vulnerable, impulsive, and less selfdisciplined.45 Because of this, the Court determined that juveniles deserve
less severe punishment because they innately have less capacity to control
their conduct and think in term of long-range outcomes.46 Through its
reasoning in Thompson, the Court highlighted the disproportionality present
in sentencing juveniles with limited criminal culpability to the most severe
sentencing possible.

38 See Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1189–90 (1970). Early in American history, state law explicitly treated children under the age of seven
differently because those below that age were believed to lack the maturity necessary to understand their
criminal behavior.
39 See generally Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010);
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
40 See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 483 (“[Y]outh matters for purposes of meting out the law’s most
serious punishments.”).
41 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
42 Id. at 818.
43 Id. at 838.
44 Id. at 833–34.
45 Id. at 834.
46 Id. at 835.
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2. Roper v. Simmons’ Categorical Ban on Capital Punishment
for Juvenile Offenders
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court expanded its ruling in
Thompson by holding that the Eighth Amendment invalidated death
sentences for offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes
were committed.47 Christopher Simmons committed murder at the age of
seventeen.48 Nine months later, after he had turned eighteen, Simmons was
tried as an adult and sentenced to death.49 After the Supreme Court held that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a mentally
retarded person,50 Simmons filed a petition for state postconviction relief.
Simmons argued that the reasoning the court applied to find that the death
penalty did not apply to the mentally retarded also applied to juveniles who
committed their crimes while under the age of eighteen.51 The Supreme Court
agreed.
The Court supported its holding with an account of juvenile
characteristics which fundamentally distinguish the mental state of juvenile
offenders from that of adults committing the same crimes.52 First, the Court
found that a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility
are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young.”53 Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”54
Third, “the character of a juvenile is not as formed as that of an adult.”55 The
Roper Court reasoned that these differences demonstrate that juveniles have
a diminished capacity, making a death penalty sentence grossly
disproportional to the juvenile’s culpability.56 As such, any penological
justification for the death penalty applicable to adults must apply with lesser
force to juveniles.57
47

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
Id. at 556.
49 Id.
50 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
51 Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
52 Id. at 569–70.
53 Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
54 Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
55 Id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)).
56 Id. at 572–73 (“The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability.”).
57 Id. at 571 (The Court could not definitively determine whether capital punishment had a
significant or measurable deterring or retributory effect on juveniles justifying its imposition at
sentencing).
48
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3. Graham v. Florida’s Categorical Ban on LWOP for NonHomicide Juvenile Offenders
The Roper Court’s categorical ban of capital punishment for juveniles
served as the basis for the Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham v. Florida,
banning LWOP sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders.58 When he
was sixteen years old, Terrance Graham attempted to rob a restaurant with
three other school-age youths.59 During the attempted robbery, one of
Graham’s accomplices struck the restaurant manager with a metal bar.60
Graham was arrested for the robbery attempt and, at the election of the
prosecutor, charged as an adult.61 Graham’s charges amounted to a firstdegree felony carrying a maximum penalty of LWOP, and a second-degree
felony carrying a maximum penalty of fifteen years’ imprisonment.62 In
exchange for a guilty plea, the sentencing court withheld adjudication of guilt
and sentenced Graham to concurrent three-year terms of probation.63 Graham
ultimately violated his probation when he became involved in another
attempted robbery.64 The trial court, expressing its view that Graham was
incorrigible and beyond the point of rehabilitation, sentenced him to the
maximum sentence authorized under each felony charge.65 Graham
challenged his sentenced under the Eighth Amendment.66
The issue which most concerned the Graham Court with LWOP
sentencing for juvenile offenders was the fact that nothing in Florida’s laws
prevented its courts from sentencing non-homicide juveniles to LWOP based
on a court’s subjective judgement that the juvenile offender is incorrigible
and his actions demonstrate an “irretrievably depraved character.”67 The
Court began its Eighth Amendment analysis of Graham’s LWOP sentence
by noting that, as applied to juvenile offenders, LWOP sentences are

58

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81–82 (2010).
Id. at 53.
60 Id.
61 Id. (under Fla. Stat. § 985.227(1)(b), it was within a prosecutor’s discretion whether to charge
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as adults or juveniles or juveniles for most felony crimes).
62 Id. at 53–54.
63 Id. at 54.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 57 (“I don’t see where any further juvenile sanctions would be appropriate. I don’t see
where any youthful offender sanctions would be appropriate . . . [I]t is apparent to the Court that you have
decided that this is the way you are going to live your life.”).
66 Id. at 52.
67 Id. at 76 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
59
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fundamentally analogous to capital punishment.68 Even though the state does
not execute a juvenile sentenced to LWOP, the sentence irrevocably alters
the offender’s life in the same way that a death penalty sentence does.69 A
LWOP sentence deprives the individual of the “most basic liberties without
giving hope of restoration.”70 The Court observed that imposing a LWOP
sentence on a juvenile offender “means denial of hope; it means that good
behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever
the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will
remain in prison for the rest of his days.”71 The Court also noted that recent
developments in psychology and brain science continued to support a finding
of fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds, including those
differences discussed in both the Thompson and Roper decisions.72 In terms
of the proportionality of a LWOP sentence for a non-homicide offender, the
Court stated that “defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that
life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms
of punishment than are murderers.”73 It follows then, that a juvenile offender
who does not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished culpability.74
The Court in Graham emphasized the ramifications of a LWOP
sentence on any offender—ramifications that are only more pronounced in
juveniles who ultimately spend more time incarcerated under a LWOP
sentence because they are younger when sentenced.75 In considering the
penological justifications typically associated with a LWOP sentence
(retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), the Court noted
that none proved sufficient to justify sentencing juvenile offenders to
LWOP.76 In fact, the Court observed that imposing a LWOP sentence on a
juvenile offender chipped away at these penological goals by refusing

68 Id. at 69 (“It is true that a death sentence is ‘unique in its severity and irrevocability,’ . . . yet
life without parole sentences share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other
sentences.”).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 69–70.
71 Id. at 70.
72 Id. at 68 (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about
the nature of juveniles.”).
73 Id. at 69.
74 Id.
75 The State does not execute the offender sentenced to life without parole, but the sentence alters
the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties
without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility
of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.
Id. at 69–70.
76 Id. at 71 (noting that LWOP sentences contradict the penological notion of rehabilitation when
applied to juveniles because they are the group most receptive to and in need of rehabilitation).
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juvenile offenders the chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.77 Thus,
sentencing juveniles to LWOP without “any legitimate penological
justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”78 After Graham,
juveniles cannot receive LWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses.79
4. Miller v. Alabama’s Shift Towards Individualized
Considerations of Age
Two years after the Court’s decision in Graham, the Court addressed
the issue of mandatory LWOP sentences imposed on juvenile homicide
offenders.80 With this case, the Court shifted its focus from the actual penalty
imposed on a juvenile to the means of imposing it. Roper and Graham placed
categorial bans on certain punishments for juveniles. In Miller, the Court
applied its previous observations of juvenile character traits from its holdings
in Roper and Graham, noting that nothing previously said about children was
crime-specific.81 The decision in Miller was based on two consolidated cases,
each involving fourteen-year-olds tried and convicted as adults for murder
and sentenced to a mandatory term of LWOP.82 In neither case did the
sentencing authority have the power to depart from LWOP, as mandated by
state law.83 In both cases, state law gave either the prosecutor or district
attorney the discretion to charge juveniles as adults when they were alleged
to have committed a serious offense, such as murder.84 Both juveniles
challenged their sentences.85Applying its previous observations on the nature
of juveniles, the Court held that before imposing a LWOP sentence on a
juvenile homicide offender, sentencers must consider the offender’s youth
and other attendant circumstances.86 The Court considered this ruling to flow
naturally from its precedents, specifically the idea that youth matters for
purposes of sentencing juveniles to the most severe sentences.87
77

Id. at 74–75.
Id. at 71.
79 Id. at 82.
80 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
81 By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without
possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their
crimes, the mandatory-sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at 489.
82 Id. at 465.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 466–68.
85 Id. at 469.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 483.
78
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In Miller, the Court’s major concern was the lack of discretionary
consideration in mandatory sentencing schemes affecting juvenile homicide
offenders.88 The Court held that by subjecting juveniles to the same
mandatory sentencing schemes as adults, the laws prohibited a sentencing
court from considering whether a LWOP sentence is proportionate
punishment, in direct violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality
principle.89 Although the case at hand involved a mandatory LWOP sentence,
the Court mentioned that youth is a mitigating factor that must always be
used when considering severe sentences for juveniles. 90 As it did in Graham,
the Court pointed out that juveniles sentenced under a mandatory scheme also
used for adults will receive the same sentence as adults but will ultimately
serve more time than their adult equivalents because they are younger when
sentenced.91 Thus, in Miller the Court articulated the need for unique juvenile
sentencing procedures.
5. Montgomery v. Louisiana Expands the Reach of Miller
In 1973, at the age of seventeen, Henry Montgomery killed a deputy
sheriff in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.92 The court automatically sentenced
Montgomery to LWOP upon the jury returning a verdict of “guilty without
capital punishment.”93 Fifty years later, when the Supreme Court decided
Miller, Montgomery sought collateral review of his mandatory life-withoutparole sentence.94
The Court cited heavily to its reasoning in Miller: “Miller requires that
before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, the sentencing judge take
into account ‘how children are different, and how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’”95 According to
the Court, “Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law,” and is
therefore retroactive because it carries a significant risk that the vast majority
of juvenile offenders face punishments that the law cannot impose upon

88 Id. at 476 (“Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account
of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.”).
89 Id. at 474.
90 Id. at 489 (“[O]ur individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have
the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for
juveniles.”).
91 Id. at 477.
92 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 726.
95 Id. at 733.
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them.96 Thus, Miller’s holding requiring that sentencing courts consider the
juvenile’s youth and its attendant characteristics applies retroactively to
juveniles who received a mandatory LWOP sentence prior to the Court’s
decision in Miller.
6. The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in the Case of Mathena
v. Malvo
On March 18, 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether its
decision in Miller banning mandatory sentences of life without parole for
juveniles can be used to upend discretionary life-without-parole sentences
imposed on teens.97 Lee Boyd Malvo was one of the two snipers behind the
Beltway sniper attacks in Washington, D.C.98 Between September 5, 2002,
and October 22, 2002, Malvo and his accomplice murdered ten people and
wounded numerous others.99 Malvo was seventeen at the time he committed
these offenses for which he was sentenced to LWOP in 2004.100 Neither the
court, prosecutor, nor Malvo’s counsel ever suggested that there was any
possibility Malvo could be sentenced to anything less than LWOP.101
Following Malvo’s convictions, the Supreme Court largely developed its
Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing jurisprudence.102 Following the
Court’s decision in Miller, Malvo filed two federal habeas petitions seeking
to vacate his LWOP sentences.103
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s holding in
Miller is a substantive constitutional guarantee that applies regardless of
whether the LWOP sentence was mandatorily imposed or discretionary. 104
The Fourth Circuit explained that under Miller, the Eighth Amendment bars
LWOP sentences for all but those rare juvenile offenders whose crimes
reflect permanent incorrigibility.105 The court determined Malvo was entitled
to resentencing since the prior sentencing authority in Malvo’s case never

96

Id. at 734.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2018)
[hereinafter Mathena Petition].
98 Id.
99 Id. at 4.
100 Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 2, Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2018)
[hereinafter Malvo Opposition].
101 Id. at 4.
102 It was during this time that the Court handed down its decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller.
103 Malvo Opposition, supra note 100, at 6.
104 Id. at 2.
105 Id. at 9.
97
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considered whether to impose a lesser sentence or whether Malvo’s crimes
reflected irreparable corruption or permanent incorrigibility.106
In his brief in opposition of writ of certiorari, Malvo argues that Eighth
Amendment concerns surrounding a LWOP sentence imposed on a juvenile
exist whether that juvenile is sentenced under a mandatory scheme or a
discretionary scheme.107 Malvo relies on the Court’s reasoning in Miller,
arguing that the reason the Court there invalidated the LWOP sentences was
because the sentences failed to “distinguish juveniles whose crimes reflect
the transient immaturity of youth from those whose crimes reflect irreparable
corruption.”108 Mere discretion is not enough to combat this failure.109 The
Eighth Amendment only permits imposing a LWOP sentence after the
sentencer considers the juvenile offender’s “diminished culpability and
heightened capacity for change” to determine if they are “the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”110
C. Reconciling Miller and Graham with the Imposition of De Facto
LWOP Sentences on Juvenile Offenders.
The Court’s decision in Graham placed a categorical ban on the practice
of sentencing non-homicide juvenile offenders to LWOP. The Court’s
decision in Miller held that a homicide juvenile offender cannot receive an
automatic LWOP sentence without the sentencing authority first considering
the juvenile’s age and the attendant circumstances surrounding his offense.
However, to date, the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed whether
the reasoning behind Graham and Miller extends to juvenile offenders
receiving discretionary sentences for a term of years that effectively
constitutes LWOP. 111 However, the Court has now agreed to decide this issue
by granting certiorari in the case of Mathena v. Malvo.112
As Supreme Court case law on juvenile sentencing currently stands,
courts still have the discretion to sentence juveniles to lengthy term-of-years
sentences, effectively constituting a life sentence, in violation of the Eighth

106

Id.
Id. at 22.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012).
111 During oral arguments in Miller, the Court addressed lengthy sentences for juveniles as an
emerging issue under the Eighth Amendment. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–5, Miller v. Alabama,
576 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 10-9646). “[O]nce you depart from the principle that we’ve enunciated that
death is different, why is life without parole categorically different from 60 years or 70 years . . . ?” Id. at
5.
112 Mathena v. Malvo, No. 18-217, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 1905 (Mar. 18, 2019).
107
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Amendment’s bar against disproportionate punishment. Although recent
studies suggest a national consensus against the use of juvenile LWOP and
highlight the consistency with which lower courts have responded to
Miller,113 the fact remains that states are still imposing lengthy sentences that
are the functional equivalent of a LWOP sentence.
A number of lower courts have recognized that, given the Court’s
emphasis on the characteristics of juveniles in Graham and its holding in
Miller focusing on individual sentencing, lengthy or de facto life-withoutparole sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.114 In Budder v. Addison, the
Tenth Circuit struck down a 155-year sentence consisting of three life-withparole sentences plus 20 years imposed on a juvenile non-homicide
offender.115 The juvenile would have had to serve 131.75 years before
becoming eligible for parole.116 Building off of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Graham, the Tenth Circuit held that the juvenile’s sentence denied him
any real opportunity to obtain release, regardless of the label that the
sentencing authority placed on the sentence.117 “In this context, there is no
material distinction between a sentence for a term of years so lengthy that it
“effectively denies the offender any material opportunity for parole” and one
that will imprison him for “life without the opportunity for parole—both are
equally irrevocable.”118
Still, there are other federal courts that have adopted a narrower
interpretation of the Court’s ruling in Miller and Graham, thereby upholding
de facto life sentences for juveniles.119 For instance, two years after the

113 See Brief for The Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & the Justice & the Criminal
Justice Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct.
718 (2016) (No. 14-280) (arguing that a national consensus exists against sentencing juveniles to LWOP).
114 See, e.g., McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the sentencing court
did not abide by the requirements set forth in Miller by sentencing a homicide juvenile offender to two
consecutive 50-year prison terms without first considering how juveniles are different. The Seventh
Circuit also held that the logic of Miller applies wherever a lengthy term of years sentence constitutes de
facto LWOP); Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a cumulative sentence of 254
years and a denial of parole for 127 years violates the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham because the
juvenile will not be eligible for parole until well beyond his life expectancy).
115 Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1049 (10th Cir. 2017).
116 Id. at 1050 (“Under Oklahoma law, a prisoner must serve 85% of his sentence before he will
be eligible for parole.”).
117 Id. at 1056 (reasoning that “[t]he Court in Graham focused, not on the label attached to the
sentence, but on the irrevocability of the punishment.”).
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2016) (Juvenile defendant’s
“600-month sentence does not fall within Miller’s categorical ban on mandatory life-without-parole
sentences” because the juvenile was “resentenced under now-advisory federal guidelines after a hearing
in which the district court carefully and thoroughly applied the teaching of Roper, Graham, and Miller.”);
Davis v. McCollum, 798 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 2015); Croft v. Williams, 773 F.3d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“[L]ife sentences for murder are discretionary under Illinois law. This is a critical difference from the
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham, the Sixth Circuit held that a nonhomicide sixteen-year-old offender receiving a consecutive, fixed-term
sentence of 89 years did not violate federal law.120 The Sixth Circuit held that
neither the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham nor its decision in Miller
applied to consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juveniles that had committed
multiple non-homicide offenses.121 However, in so ruling, the Sixth Circuit
overlooked the essence of the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham that
juvenile offenders must be afforded some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.122 Even the Sixth
Circuit, in its holding, agrees that the juvenile offender’s 89-year sentence is
the functional equivalent of life without parole.123 However, the court
provides a technical interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham
to distinguish between a de facto life sentence and an actual life sentence. 124
By focusing so intently on the letter of the law, the Sixth Circuit disregarded
the spirit of the law embodied in the Supreme Court’s Graham decision
which centered on providing juvenile offenders with a meaningful chance at
rehabilitation, regardless of the exact labeling of the juvenile’s sentence.
III.

EXPLAINING THE DISPARITY AMONG COURTS REGARDING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUVENILE DE FACTO LIFE
SENTENCES

This section will explain various factors arguably contributing to the
existing circuit split regarding the constitutionality of sentencing juveniles to
lengthy term-of-years sentences in which the possibility of parole occurs
considerably past the juvenile’s average life expectancy.
A. Automatic Transfer Laws Result in Adult Treatment of Juvenile
Offenders
One factor creating disparities in juvenile sentencing practices is
automatic transfer statutes requiring that juveniles charged with certain
offenses be transferred to adult court for sentencing. Transferring a juvenile’s
case into adult court makes it possible for juveniles to receive mandatory
situation presented in Miller, which considered only ‘mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles.’”).
120 Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 2012).
121 Id. (“Graham is not clearly applicable to this case.”).
122 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
123 Bunch, 685 F.3d at 551.
124 Id. (“[I]n Graham, the Court said that a juvenile is entitled to such a ‘realistic opportunity to
obtain release’ if a state imposes a sentence of ‘life.’ . . . That did not happen in this case.”).
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LWOP sentences because mandatory LWOP sentences are still permissible
for adults. The transfers also make it more likely that a juvenile will receive
a lengthy term-of-years sentence constituting a de facto LWOP sentence
because sentencing authorities in adult courts will be less likely to consider
age as a factor diminishing the applicable sentencing range.125 As of 2014,
29 states had automatic transfer statutes and essentially all states allow judges
to waive juveniles to the adult system.126 When juveniles are transferred to
adult court, they are subject to mandatory sentencing schemes applicable to
adults and are only afforded the sentencing considerations given to adult
offenders.127 In light of this possibility, the Supreme Court’s precedent for
juvenile sentencing, with the exception of the Court’s decision in Roper, is
virtually without implementational force.128
The ability to automatically transfer a juvenile’s case to adult court upon
satisfaction of the transfer statute requirements undermines the Court’s
holding in Miller calling for individualized considerations of a juvenile
offender’s age and attendant circumstances. Discretionary transfer statutes
placing the decision to transfer in the hands of the prosecutor or judge are
also problematic, given that these statutes do not require transferring
authorities to take the offender’s age into account when deciding to transfer,
and usually, prosecutors are making the decision to transfer based solely off
of the facts of the case.129 Whether automatic or discretionary, transfer
statutes disregard a juvenile’s unique ability to rehabilitate.130 Once in adult
court, the penological justifications typically inapplicable to a juvenile
offender form the basis for the juvenile’s lengthy term-of-years sentence.131
It is possible for juveniles to receive de facto LWOP sentence in adult court
because the requirement that the juvenile receive a meaningful opportunity
125 In Miller, Justice Kagan explained that states allowing juvenile LWOP sentences do so through
“two independent statutory provisions,” one allowing the transfer of juvenile cases to adult court, the other
setting general penalties applicable to all offenders tried in adult court. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,
485 (2012).
126 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, KEY FACTS: YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2012),
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/KeyYouthCrimeFacts.pdf.
127 Id. at 3; see also Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., RL30822, Juvenile Delinquents and
Federal Criminal Law: The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and Related Matters 16 (2004) (“Juveniles
transferred for trial as adults in federal court are essentially treated as adults, with few distinctions afforded
or required because of their age.”).
128 See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) (“A defendant who has been found guilty of [a capital offense] shall
be sentenced to death if . . . it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death is justified, except that
no person may be sentenced to death who was less than 18 years of age at the time of the offense.”).
129 Miller, 567 U.S. at 487–88 (citing DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, P. GRIFFIN, S. ADDIE, B. ADAMS, & K. FIRESTINE, TRYING JUVENILES AS
ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 5 (2011)).
130 Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and
Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 92, 94 (2013).
131 Supra Part II (B).
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for release espoused under Graham no longer applies in an adult court, where
a juvenile is tried as an adult.132
Additionally, it is possible that a juvenile in a particular state is
automatically considered an adult for criminal justice purposes because they
reached the statutorily defined age at which they are legally considered an
adult.133 The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions—41 states and the
District of Columbia—define age 17 as the oldest age that an individual can
have a case originate in juvenile court.134 In two states, the youngest age at
which a juvenile is considered an adult for criminal justice purposes is 15.135
In those states, the juvenile’s trial originates in adult criminal court.136
B. Sentencing Factors and Guidelines Fail to Adequately Account for
Youth Characteristics Discussed in Supreme Court Cases
Contributing to the disparity among courts in determining how to
approach juvenile de facto LWOP sentencing is the fact the advisory
sentencing guidelines, which sentencing courts are required to consult,
provide relatively little to no recommendations pertinent to juvenile
offenders. As explained below, once transferred to federal court, the
recommendations applicable to juveniles fail to reflect both the spirit of the
law as well as the transition towards individualized considerations of youth
characteristics espoused in the Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing cases.
Sentencing authorities follow a three-step process when sentencing
defendants. First, the court calculates the applicable guideline range and
sentence enhancement by referring to the Sentencing Commission’s
sentencing table.137 On one axis of the table is a range quantifying the
seriousness of an offense, and on the other axis of the table is the offender’s

132 See generally Patrick Griffin, Sean Addie, Benjamin Adams & Kathy Firestine, Trying
Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF
JUVENILE
JUSTICE
&
DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION
(September
2011),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf (discussing how juvenile offenders transferred to adult
court face the possibility of receiving sentences decades longer that what they would have received in
juvenile court).
133 Nicole Scialabba, Should Juveniles Be Charged as Adults in the Criminal Justice System?,
A.B.A. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrensrights/articles/2016/should-juveniles-be-charged-as-adults/.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_Sentencing_Guidelines.p
df.
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prior criminal history.138 The applicable sentencing range arises from the
point at which the offense level intersects the offender’s criminal history
classification.139 Second, the court considers motions to depart from the
applicable sentencing range by assessing the sentencing guidelines and
official commentary of the Commission.140 Third, the court considers the
factors in Section 3553(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code.141
When a defendant is convicted of a federal offense, the sentencing
authority, although not bound to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, must
consult and take them into account when sentencing a defendant.142 In
Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme Court held that sentencing courts
are free to disregard the policies of the Guidelines and may find that a
sentencing recommendation is “greater than necessary.”143 Thus, the
Guidelines continue to stand as a required and fundamental starting point in
federal sentencing.
As pertaining to juveniles, relatively few sections from the Guidelines
offer a sentencing court guidance with how to proceed in sentencing. Section
5H1.12 provides that “[l]ack of guidance as a youth and similar
circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant
grounds in determining whether a departure is warranted.”144 This is due to
the fact that the sentencing guidelines are crafted for adult offenders, not
juveniles.145 However, as the Supreme Court has noted time and again,
juveniles and adults are not the same and should not be treated the same for
sentencing purposes. 146 Juveniles have a diminished culpability level and a
heightened capacity for change.147 These capacities differ substantially from
the capacities of adults.148
Section 5H1.12 inherently discourages sentencing courts from
considering a juvenile’s upbringing in determining whether to depart from
the recommended sentencing range. This directly contravenes Miller, which

138 FEDERAL SENTENCING TABLE,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelinesmanual/2016/Sentencing_Table.pdf.
139 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 137, at 3.
140 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2012).
141 Id. § 3553(a)(1).
142 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
143 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 110 (2007).
144 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.12 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
145 Note, Mending the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Approach to Consideration of Juvenile
Status, 130 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1010 (2017).
146 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
147 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 460.
148 Emily Steiner, Mandatory Minimums, Maximum Consequences, JUV. L. CTR. (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://jlc.org/news/mandatory-minimums-maximum-consequences.
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required an individualized consideration of a juvenile’s characteristics.149
The Court in Miller implicitly touched upon the juvenile offender’s lack of
guidance in discussing and referencing back to the child’s upbringing in its
holding.150 Therefore, Miller’s lack of guidance as a youth factored into the
Court’s analysis of his sentence.
Even more problematic is the Commission’s Departure and Variance
Primer, explicitly stating that, “[a] defendant’s guideline sentence is to be
based on the offense the defendant committed, not the character of the
defendant.”151 This runs contrary to the notion espoused by the Supreme
Court that “juveniles are different.”152 Thus, the Commission’s failure to
advise sentencing courts to consider a juvenile defendant’s character
disregards the Court’s transition towards individualized considerations of age
and other attendant circumstances as espoused in Miller.
The Commission’s only other age-related guidance is found in Section
5K2.22 of the Guidelines and is limited in its application to sentencing for a
defendant convicted of an offense involving a minor victim.153 Section
5K2.22(1) provides that the defendant’s age may be reason to depart
downwards from the applicable sentencing range to the extent permitted by
Section 5H1.1.154 However, as discussed above, the Commission discourages
consideration of age as a mitigating factor under Section 5H1.1.155
The Commission’s policy statements discouraging the consideration of
age further complicate juvenile sentencing when considering the statutory
requirement under 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) that sentencing judges consider
all relevant characteristics of an offender.156 Section 3553(a) is a catch-all
provision providing for consideration of numerous factors, including: “the

149

See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 460.
Id. at 479 (“Miller’s stepfather physically abused him; his alcoholic and drug-addicted mother
neglected him; he had been in and out of foster care as a result; and he had tried to kill himself four times,
the first when he should have been in kindergarten.”).
151 OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEPARTURE AND VARIANCE PRIMER
31
(2013),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2014_Primer_Departure_Variance.pdf
(discouraging consideration of age under §5H.1. of the Guidelines).
152 See supra Part II (B).
153 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.22 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
154 Id. at § 5K2.22(1).
155 Section 5H1.1 of the Guidelines provides that age “may be relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted, if considerations based on age, individually or in combination with other offender
characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered
by the guidelines.” However, the Commission does not explain what constitutes an unusual degree
warranting consideration of age.
156 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
150
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need for the sentence imposed,”157 “the kinds of sentences available,”158 “the
need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense,”159 and “the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant.”160 It follows, logically, that age would be one such characteristic
that the court is required to consider.161 However, Congress failed to define
under Section 3553 what exactly constitutes the “characteristics of the
defendant.”162
The disparity between Supreme Court precedent urging consideration of
youth and the Guidelines discouraging consideration of the offender’s youth
and other attendant circumstances contributes to the existing circuit splits
regarding the constitutionality of de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile
offenders. As demonstrated above, the Guidelines are ambivalent in their
treatment of juvenile and adult offenders, affording both groups the same
considerations when determining whether to reduce an applicable sentencing
range. However, the penological goals applicable to adult offenders, which
the Guidelines take into account, are not applicable to juvenile offenders who
lack the level of moral culpability that an adult offender possesses and who
demonstrate a greater rehabilitation capability than their adult counterparts.
163
Because the Commission discourages consideration of youth
characteristics, courts analyzing lengthy juvenile terms often are left to apply
strict interpretations of the guidelines and Supreme Court precedent.164
As discussed, the Commission’s Guidelines for sentencing and transfer
statutes removing juvenile offenders from juvenile to adult court systems do
not preclude the possibility that a juvenile offender receive a sentence
extending well beyond average life expectancy. Rather, they facilitate the

157

Id. § 3553(a)(2).
Id. § 3553(a)(3).
159 Id. § 3553(a)(7).
160 Id. § 3553(a)(1).
161 The Supreme Court’s precedent in Roper, Miller, and Graham suggest that an offender’s
juvenile status is a characteristic that sentencing courts must consider. This is evidenced in the Court’s
observations of general characteristics pertaining to all juveniles.
162 Note, supra note 145, at 1011.
163 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 461 (2012) (“[D]istinctive attributes of youth diminish
the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they
commit terrible crimes.”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010); see also Note, supra note 145,
at 1012 (“A court applying the Guidelines without considering ratcheting a sentence down based on youth
applies a system premised on the sufficient and necessary penological purposes of sentencing the typical
offender: an adult.”).
164 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2016) (interpreting the
Supreme Court’s decision in Miller as constituting a categorical ban on Mandatory LWOP sentences while
disregarding the Court’s larger holding that sentencing courts must take into account a juvenile’s age and
other attendant circumstances prior to receiving a LWOP sentence).
158
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imposition of such sentences because the sentencing courts are not assessing
the juvenile’s youth characteristics when determining sentences.165
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
With its decision in Miller, the Supreme Court took juvenile sentencing
in a new direction by holding that juvenile offenders have a right to have their
age taken into consideration before being sentenced to LWOP. However, as
discussed in the preceding section, lower courts encounter difficulty
reconciling the Court’s holding in Miller with the Guidelines and transfer
statutes which both discourage consideration of an offender’s age and treat
juveniles as adults with the same aptitude for moral culpability. The result of
sentencing courts attempting to reconcile these two factors is that juveniles
receive lengthy term-of-years sentences placing their first opportunity of
release well beyond the average life expectancy. What follows are
suggestions and recommendations that would ensure sentencing courts apply
the Supreme Court’s reasoning when examining the Guidelines and statutory
provisions for juvenile sentencing.
A. Extending Graham’s Analysis of Penological Goals to De Facto
LWOP Sentences
In Graham, the Supreme Court largely based its decision to
categorically ban LWOP sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders by
reasoning that the penological goals typically served by such a sentence did
not apply to juvenile offenders with the same force with which they applied
to adults.166 The Court’s considerations regarding the applicability of the
penological goals to juvenile offenders was not crime specific and centered
more on the nature of juveniles as well as the nature of a LWOP sentence.
These elements are both present in instances where juveniles are sentenced
to lengthy term-of-years sentences effectively constituting LWOP, but for
their label.
Extending the Court’s assessment of the penological goals to analyze
potential justifications for de facto LWOP sentences renders them
unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Lengthy sentencing
terms which place a juvenile’s first opportunity at release well beyond

165 See Note, supra note 145, at 1012 (“The resultant sentence for a youth offender convicted as
an adult then is likely ‘greater than necessary’ under § 3553(a) when youth status is not accounted for.”).
166 Graham, 560 U.S. at 70–71.
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average life expectancy are incompatible with the goals of retribution,
deterrence, and incapacitation.167
The Court in Graham held that the goal of retribution is based on the
idea that a “criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal offender.”168 Society is entitled to impose severe
sanctions on a criminal offender to express its condemnation of the crime and
seek restoration of the moral imbalance brought about by the crime.169
However, sentencing a juvenile to a term effectively constituting LWOP
cannot be said to be proportional to the juvenile’s personal culpability when,
as the Court acknowledges, juveniles have a diminished moral culpability.170
The case for this argument is stronger in instances where juveniles
committing non-homicide offenses are sentenced to de facto LWOP. In those
cases, there is a proportionality concern triggering Eighth Amendment
considerations that a virtual LWOP sentence constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
The Court in Graham did not believe that the penological justification
of deterrence justified LWOP for juvenile offenders, and its reasoning for so
believing also applies to de facto LWOP sentences.171 The deterrence
justification is effective when individuals are capable of taking into account
possible punishment. However, this is not the case with juveniles who “lack
maturity” and have “an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” and are
therefore more likely to engage in poor decision-making.172 Thus, punishing
a juvenile under the penological justification of deterrence through a LWOP
sentence or a sentence effectively constituting LWOP is grossly
disproportional to a juvenile offender’s ability to make responsible decisions.
Incapacitation is yet another penological goal that cannot be justified
under either a LWOP sentence or a de facto LWOP sentence.173 The purpose
of the incapacitation goal is to segregate individuals who repeatedly commit
criminal offenses from the rest of society for an extended period of time.174
As the Court noted in Graham, the characteristics associated with youth make
incapacitation a questionable justification for sentencing juveniles to life
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Id. at 71.
Id.
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170 Id. at 71–72.
171 Id. at 72 (“[T]he same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . .
that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”).
172 Id.
173 Id. (“To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will be
a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.”).
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sentences, whether explicitly or implicitly. This is due to the difficulty in
assessing the level of risk a juvenile offender poses to society.175
Finally, rehabilitation is a penological goal, which, in the case of
juveniles, is best served outside of incarceration. The Court defines
Rehabilitation as the right to reenter society.176 By sentencing juveniles to
LWOP or de facto LWOP, courts are denying juveniles the right to a
meaningful opportunity for release. In the case of de facto LWOP, an
offender’s first opportunity for release often comes at a point when the
juvenile is beyond the age of retirement or the average life expectancy. In
Graham, the Court noted that defendants serving LWOP sentences are often
denied access to vocational training and other rehabilitative services.177
Thus, by assessing the extent to which the traditional penological
justifications apply to a juvenile offender, sentencing courts can ensure that
the sentence imposed on a juvenile comports with the Supreme Court’s
observations regarding the juvenile’s unique nature.
B. Adopt Additional Sentencing Factor Considerations; Define Those
Factors Which Are Ambiguous
Sentencing courts are required to consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C.
Section 3553(a) in imposing a sentence. The factors listed include the
characteristics of the defendant. However, Congress has failed to provide any
further explanation as to which specific aspects of the defendant’s
characteristics must be considered.178 As discussed above, this ambiguity
makes virtual LWOP for juveniles possible because sentencing courts are not
provided with a clear indication of the factors they must consider pertaining
to an offender’s age. As such, the factors fail to account for the Supreme
Court’s focus on the unique nature of juvenile offenders and how that nature
should be taken into account at sentencing.
The Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grant recommending
two new factors for sentencing courts to consider, in addition to the Section
3553(a) factors, is a step in the right direction: first, courts must calculate the
juvenile’s average life expectancy, and, second, courts must shape a sentence
that properly accounts for a “meaningful opportunity for release.”179 In 1992,
sixteen-year-old Grant was convicted of conspiracy and racketeering under
175

Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
177 Id. (“For juvenile offenders, who are most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation . . . the
absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes the disproportionality of the sentence all the
more evident.”).
178 See Note, supra note 145.
179 United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 148–49 (3d Cir. 2018).
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the RICO Act, as well as various drug trafficking charges and a gun charge.
At sentencing, the district court, in its own discretion, determined that Grant
would never be fit to reenter society and therefore sentenced him to life in
prison without the possibility of parole.180 At resentencing, in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, the district court determined that Grant’s
upbringing and debilitating characteristics of youth demonstrated his
capacity to reform, thereby making a LWOP sentence inappropriate.181
Instead of a LWOP sentence, the District Court now sentenced Grant to sixtyfive years without parole.182 On appeal, Grant argued that his sentence
constituted a de facto LWOP because his earliest opportunity for release is at
age seventy-two, the same age as his life expectancy. 183
The Third Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of a term-of-years sentence lasting for the duration of a juvenile’s
life expectancy, particularly in instances where the juvenile’s crimes
demonstrate immaturity rather than irreparable corruption. In so holding, the
court instructed sentencing courts to first conduct individualized evidentiary
hearings to determine the juvenile’s life expectancy and whether there exists
within the applicable sentence a meaningful opportunity for release.184 The
Third Circuit reasoned that, by considering the juvenile’s average life
expectancy, courts prevent sentencing juveniles that are capable of reform to
a term of years that denies them a meaningful opportunity at release.185
The Third Circuit also required that sentencing courts assess whether
there exists a meaningful opportunity for release.186 In order to do this, the
court recommends considering the age of retirement as a sentencing factor
for juveniles determined to be capable of reform.187 According to the court,
the age of retirement constitutes a transitional life stage where an individual
permanently leaves the work force after contributing to society over the
course of their work life.188 The court defined a meaningful opportunity for
release stating, “a non-incorrigible juvenile offender must be afforded an
opportunity for release at a point in his or her life that still affords ‘fulfillment
outside prison walls,’ ‘reconciliation with society,’ ‘hope,’ and ‘the
opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human
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worth and potential.’”189 A sentence preserving the juvenile’s ability to
contribute productively to society by placing the point of release prior to the
age of retirement allows a juvenile to accomplish all of this.
The Grant court noted that they were bound by the Supreme Court’s
mandate and that juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect “transient
immaturity of youth” had a right to a meaningful opportunity for release.190
Sentencing Courts should follow the same analysis laid out by the Third
Circuit in Grant because the court’s analysis there comported with the
Supreme Court’s observations regarding the nature and characteristics of
juveniles.191 Considering the juvenile’s average life expectancy and whether
a sentence affords the juvenile a meaningful opportunity for release fills the
gaps left by the sentencing guidelines and factors, which, as explained above,
fail to adequately take into account a juvenile’s youth and attendant
circumstances.
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing cases ensure that a juvenile
offender’s sentence does not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment, to a certain
extent. Currently, the Court’s precedent does not outright preclude juvenile
offenders from receiving lengthy term-of-years sentences for both homicide
and non-homicide offenses. These lengthy sentences are the clear equivalent
of a LWOP sentence because they place the juvenile’s first opportunity at
release well beyond the age of retirement or, in more extreme instances,
beyond average life expectancy. With a de facto LWOP sentence, a juvenile
is not afforded a meaningful opportunity for release. Under the Eighth
Amendment, this punishment is disproportionate to that which such an
immature and vulnerable class as juveniles can be deemed to deserve.
Lower courts are split on the issue of whether a de facto LWOP sentence
violates the Eighth Amendment. This discord among the courts can be
attributed to the lack of guidance sentencing courts receive when sentencing
juveniles. Once a juvenile is transferred to federal court, the applicable
sentencing guidelines and factors that the sentencing authority considers fail
to provide sufficient means through which to account for the juvenile’s age
and other mitigating circumstances surrounding juvenile status. Thus, the
sentencing factors and guidelines applicable to juveniles in federal court do
not comport with Supreme Court precedent. This deficiency provides the
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Id. at 147 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010)).
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191 Id. (“[W]e elect to fashion a principled legal framework that carries out the Supreme Court’s
holdings but goes no further.”).
190

9 - FERNANDEZ (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

3/22/2021 10:57 AM

“Juveniles Are Different”: Easier Said than Done

801

grounds for courts to view the constitutionality of de facto LWOP sentences
differently. One sentencing court following the strictest interpretation of the
Supreme Court’s holdings and abiding by the limited sentencing guidelines
and factors may find that a de facto LWOP sentence does not violate the
Eighth Amendment. However, another sentencing court recognizing the
importance of the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s holdings and the
inability of the sentencing guidelines and factors to account for the mitigating
circumstances of youth may find a de facto LWOP sentence unconstitutional.
In an effort to resolve this disparity, sentencing courts should engage in
an analysis of the traditional penological justifications applicable to juvenile
offenders. This analysis would enable courts to ensure that the imposed
sentence comports with the Supreme Court’s observations regarding the
unique characteristics of juveniles. Additionally, sentencing courts should
mirror the Third Circuit’s approach to juvenile de facto LWOP sentences by
considering, in addition to the sentencing guidelines and factors, the
juvenile’s average life expectancy and whether a proposed sentence affords
the juvenile a meaningful opportunity for release.

